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Abstract
Machine learning models have been shown vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks launched by adversarial examples which are
carefully crafted by attacker to defeat classifiers. Deep learn-
ing models cannot escape the attack either. Most of adversarial
attack methods are focused on success rate or perturbations
size, while we are more interested in perturbation’s relation-
ship with the image itself. In this paper, we put forward a novel
adversarial attack based on contour, named FineFool. Finefool
not only has better attack performance compared with other
state-of-art white-box attacks with higher attack success rate
and smaller perturbation, but also is capable of visualization
the optimal adversarial perturbation via attention on object
contour. To the best of our knowledge, Finefool is for the first
time combines the critical feature of the original clean image
with the optimal perturbations in a visible manner. Inspired by
the correlations between adversarial perturbations and object
contour, slighter perturbations is produced via focusing fea-
tures on object contour, which is more imperceptible and hard
to be defended, especially network add-on defense methods
with the trade-off between perturbations filtering and contour
feature loss. Compared with existing state-of-art attacks, ex-
tensive experiments are conducted to show that Finefool is
capable of efficient attack against defensive deep models.
Introduction
In recent years, deep learning has shown outstanding per-
formance in many professional tasks, including computer
vision, bioinformatics, complex networks, natural language
processing, etc. However, the shortcomings of deep learn-
ing are gradually exposed with its wide application. One of
the serious drawbacks in deep learning is the vulnerability
of deep models against adversarial examples. For instance,
adversarial image, produced by adding carefully designed
perturbations to clean image, will be misclassified by state-
of-the-art deep model in image classification task. To make
matters worse, the perturbations of effective adversarial ex-
ample are very slight and invisible to human visual system.
With the study extends, adversarial attacks against deep
models are gradually systematized, e.g. white/black/semi-
black box attacks based on the exposure degree of deep
model, or targeted/untargeted attacks based on requirements
Copyright c© 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
of the adversary. Moreover, seminal works on adversarial
examples fooling deep models exists not only in digital space
but also in physical world (Evtimov et al. 2017).
The white-box attack assumes a full exposure of target
deep model, including its parameters, model structure, train-
ing process, and even training data. The black-box attack
denotes adversarial examples (during testing) generated by
model output without the knowledge of that model. And
semi-black-box attack is between white-box and black-box
attacks, assuming that adversary has limited knowledge of
deep model (e.g. training process and/or model structure),
but certainly does not know its parameters. Generally speak-
ing, the perturbations of white-box attack are carefully de-
signed by gradient back propagation, which is slight but weak
transferability against different deep models. And adversarial
examples of black-box attack are usually produced via the
optimization methods, which have stronger attack transfer-
ability but slightly larger perturbations.
In order to illustrate targeted/untargeted attacks clearly,
given a classifier f(Θ, x): x ∈ X → y ∈ Y , and clean input
x ∈ X at first, where Θ denotes deep model parameters. The
task of untargeted attack can be expressed as: f(Θ, x) = y,
f(Θ, x∗) 6= y, where y is ground-truth label of clean example
x, and x∗ is adversarial example crafted by adding slight
perturbations to x. Similarly, adversarial examples generation
for targeted attack against deep model satisfies the condition:
f(Θ, x) = y, f(Θ, x∗) = y′, where y′ is specific target
label preset by adversary, and y′ 6= y. Moreover, the Lp
norm of perturbations is not allowed to be greater than preset
threshold , which can be denoted as ||x∗ − x||p < .
As mentioned above, adversarial attacks cause misclas-
sification of deep models by adding perturbations to clean
examples. And adversarial attacks can severely destroy the
performance of deep models, which threaten the security
of deep learning-based applications and limit its further re-
search. There are various opinions in the literature about vul-
nerability of deep models to carefully designed adversarial
perturbations. (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) first
proposed the view-point that the design of modern deep mod-
els that forces them to behave linearly in high dimensional
spaces also makes them vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Furthermore, (Tanay and Griffin 2016) proposed the ‘bound-
ary tilting’ perspective, which refuted the linear hypothesis.
(Cubuk et al. 2017) consider that the “origin of adversarial
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examples is primarily due to an inherent uncertainty that neu-
ral networks have about their predictions”. (Rozsa, Gunther,
and Boult 2016) argue that vulnerability of deep model is
caused by the training stagnation of its decision boundary.
And flatness of decision boundaries, large local curvature
of decision boundaries and low flexibility of deep models
are other interpretations for adversarial attacks against deep
models (Akhtar and Mian 2018).
Since deep model has outstanding capacity of critical
feature extracting, the extracted feature mainly locates on
object contour. We believe there are hidden relationships
between carefully designed adversarial perturbations and
original clean image, especially the object contour in the
image. Moreover, what is the correlation between pertur-
bations and feature maps in hidden layers of deep model?
Motivated by the question, we visualize the extracted ob-
ject contour, pay attention to the critical local feature, up-
date perturbations via back propagation gradient and forward
propagation attention map. We propose a novel adversarial
attack method FineFool with slighter perturbations faster
on the premise of guaranteeing attack effect. Besides, Fine-
fool is an efficient tool to evaluate the defensibility of deep
model, and can improve its defensibility by adversarial train-
ing (Miyato, Dai, and Goodfellow 2016; Miyato et al. 2017;
Madry et al. 2017). What’s more, attention mechanism of
feature maps in deep model is used to figure out attention
map, which consists of channel spatial attention and pixel
spatial attention. And visualization is applied to observe
relativity of feature maps and attention map with pertur-
bations, and interpret deep models (Koh and Liang 2017;
Dong et al. 2017b).
As opposed to attack, adversarial defense is also a research
focus. There are mainly three types of defense methods, in-
cluding input modification, network structure modification
and network add-on. The implementation of input modifi-
cation defense method destroys carefully designed pertur-
bations by modifying input data, e.g. discrete re-encoding,
adding random noise, or image flip/rotation. And network
structure modification is applied to improve network robust-
ness by modifying network architecture, such as activation
function, polling layer, convolution layer, etc. The network
add-on defense method keeps the original deep model intact
and appends external model to it during testing, e.g. pertur-
bation rectifying network (Akhtar, Liu, and Mian 2017). But
FineFool can effectively beat deep model with defensive net-
work add-on, which defenses against adversarial examples
by filtering out perturbations. If keeping up object contour
with classification feature, the perturbations crafted by atten-
tion focus of object contour can not be completely filtered.
Conversely, filtering perturbations generated by FineFool
will cause a great loss of object contour with classification
information. Hence, the trade-off between perturbations fil-
tering and object contour keeping determines attack ability
of FineFool against network add-on defense.
In summary, main contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows:
• Compared with the current state-of-the-art attacks, the
perturbations of FineFool can be further reduced while
maintaining similar attack success rate. And slighter per-
turbations is implemented by focusing features onto object
contour, which is the first time introducing attention mech-
anism into adversarial attacks to the best of our knowledge.
• An important observation has been made by visualization
that there are strong correlations between perturbations
and object contour, feature maps, attention map. And per-
turbations crafted by FineFool is an inseparable part of
original image, which is more invisible. The observation
provides a new research direction for adversarial examples
generation.
• Intensive experiments on ImageNet dataset show that the
proposed method is attack effective against different deep
models with defensive network add-on, which can be ap-
plied to evaluate robustness of deep models and train a
robust model via adversarial training.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related
works are discussed in Section 2. The FineFool method and
critical techniques are introduced in Section 3. The exper-
iments and conclusions are presented in Section 4 and 5,
respectively.
Related Works
Here we summarize related works on attacking and defend-
ing deep models against adversarial examples, and attention
mechanism.
Attacks to DNN
There are mainly two types of attacks based on transparency
degree of DNN model, gradient-based and optimization-
based attacks, corresponding to white-box and black-box
attacks,respectively. The white-box attack methods applied
in experiments is described in detail below.
Fast Gradient Sign Model (FGSM): (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) proposed the simplest and
most widely used untargeted attack, which applied back-
ward propagation gradient from the target DNN to gen-
erate adversarial examples. Perturbation is evaluated by
ρ = sign(5J(θ, Ic, l)), where5J denotes the gradient of
the original image Ic around the model parameters θ. sign(.)
denotes the sign function, and  is a small scalar value that
limits the disturbance norm.
MI-FGSM: (Dong et al. 2017a) introduced a broad class
of momentum-based iterative algorithms to boost adversar-
ial attack ability, which can stabilize update directions and
escape from poor local maxima during the iterations via in-
tegrating the momentum term into the iterative process for
attacks. And the momentum iterative algorithm was applied
to an ensemble of deep models, which show that the adver-
sarially trained models with a strong defense ability are also
vulnerable to MI-FGSM.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): (Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017) mentioned the standard method for large-scale
constrained optimization, PGD, which performs one step of
standard gradient descent, and then clips all the coordinates
to be within the box. (Madry et al. 2017) demonstrated the
local maxima found by PGD all have similar loss values,
both for normally trained networks and adversarially trained
networks. This concentration phenomenon suggests that ro-
bustness against the PGD adversary yields generalization of
robustness.
Basic Iterative Model (BIM): (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
Bengio 2016) demonstrated a standard convex optimization
method, BIM, which is equivalent to projected gradient de-
scent. It is an extension of the single-step method, which takes
multiple small step iterations while adjusting the direction
after each step. After a sufficient number of iterations, BIM
can successfully generate an adversarial example classified
into the target label.
DeepFool: (Moosavi Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016)
proposed DeepFool, which is a simple but very effective
untargeted attack. In each iteration, it calculates the minimum
distance d(y1, y0) required for each label y1 6= y0 to reach
the class boundary by approximating the model label with a
linear label. y1 represents the label of the adversarial example
classified by deep model, and y0 represents the true label of
the adversarial example. Then make the appropriate steps in
the direction of the nearest class. The image perturbation for
each iteration are accumulated and the final perturbation is
calculated once the output criteria changes.
Carlini and Wagner Attacks (C&W): (Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017) designed C&W attack, which is one of the strongest
attacks. Its attack essence is a kind of refined iterative gradi-
ent attack that uses the Adam optimizer. It uses the internal
configuration of the target DNN to guide the attack, and uses
L2 specification to quantify the difference between the hostile
and original image.
Defenses in DNN
With the continuous expansion of deep learning, its vul-
nerability to adversarial attacks needs to be addressed ur-
gently. Currently, there are several essential explanations
for adversarial examples, including linearity hypothesis,
high-nonlinearity, subspace intersection, boundary tilting,
inherent prediction uncertainty, evolutionary stalling and so
on (Akhtar and Mian 2018). And different methods to defend
against attacks have been put forward based on the different
understandings of the essence.
According to implementation, there are three types of de-
fense methods including modified training/input, modifying
network and network add-on.
Modified Training/Input: (Szegedy et al. 2013) first pro-
posed adversarial training with mixed data to improve de-
fense against specific attack. (Miyato, Dai, and Goodfel-
low 2016) and (Zheng et al. 2016) designed virtual adver-
sarial training and stability training to enhance defense ef-
fect, respectively. There are many modification methods of
training data, including down-sampling (Guo et al. 2017),
high-frequency filtering (Das et al. 2017), data compres-
sion (Bhagoji et al. 2017), random scale transformation (Xie
et al. 2017), thermometer encoding (Jacob et al. 2018) etc.
Modifying Network: Network modification refers to im-
proving defense by modifying structure or parameters. Such
methods include Deep Contractive Networks (DCNs) (Gu
and Rigazio 2014), gradient regularization (Ross and Doshi-
Velez 2017), defensive distillation (Papernot et al. 2016),
DeepCloak based on masking layer (Gao et al. 2017), Hyper-
Networks with statistical filtering (Sun, Ozay, and Okatani
2017) etc. (Nayebi and Ganguli 2017) studied the relationship
between vulnerability of DNNs and the linearity of activation.
(Madry et al. 2017) provided a novel perspective based on
robust optimization. And (Wan et al. 2018) improved defense
performance by designing a new loss function.
Network Add-on: The defense is implemented by con-
necting one or more external expansion models in maintain-
ing integrity of model structure. The common expansion mod-
els include Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN) (Akhtar,
Liu, and Mian 2017), external multi-detectors (Meng and
Chen 2017) and GAN framework (Lee, Han, and Lee 2017).
Attention Mechanism for DNN
Recently, attention mechanisms achieve state-of-the-art per-
formance in deep learning that capture global dependen-
cies, especially tackling sequential decision tasks, e.g. spatio-
temporal attention model with long short term memory is
applied to human action recognition. (Xu et al. 2015) demon-
strated the first visual attention model in video captioning,
which can pay close attention to critical information of object.
(Yang et al. 2016) applied a stacked spatial attention model
to text generation and public opinion prediction, which pro-
duced the second attention layer via modulating the attention
map of the first one.
Different from sequential decision tasks, attention mecha-
nism also plays a critical role in the region of computer vision
with image processing tasks. (Wang et al. 2017) introduced
attention mechanism into convolutional neural network, resid-
ual attention network, can improve the performance based on
trained Residual Network in an end-to-end training fashion.
(Zhang et al. 2018) proposed the self-attention generative
adversarial network to generate more refined images, which
traversed feature map with attention-driven to focus on spatial
critical information. (Chen et al. 2017) introduced a novel
convolutional neural network, SCA-CNN, which incorpo-
rated spatial and channel-wise attentions in convolutional
neural network. And inspired by this, critical information
concerns based on attention mechanism are applied to opti-
mize the perturbation distribution in this paper.
FineFool Method
The effectiveness of adversarial examples consists of attack
ability and perturbations, and strength of attack ability de-
pends on perturbation size and perturbation distribution. Gen-
erally speaking, the greater the perturbations, the stronger the
attack ability. However, the characteristics of effective adver-
sarial examples are smaller perturbations and stronger attack
ability. Therefore, the task of generating effective adversar-
ial examples is a contradictory multi-objective optimization
problem. Two issues are studied in this paper, how to search
for appropriate position to add perturbations, and how to cal-
culate imperceptible perturbations. Driven by this research
Figure 1: Framework of the FineFool attack method. ‘Deep model’ denotes model to be attacked, ‘feature map’ denotes output of
deep model in shallow feature layer, ‘perturbation’ is magnified 255 times for better visualization. The channel spatial attention
function Φc is used to obtain the channel spatial attention weight Wc, which are multiplied in channel of the feature map. Then,
pixel spatial attention function Φp is used to obtain the pixel spatial attention weights Wp, which are multiplied in each pixel
points, resulting in an attention map.
mission, a novel approach to adversarial examples genera-
tion, FineFool, is proposed, which can improve the size and
distribution of perturbations. The framework of FineFool
is shown in Figure 1, where deep model will be attacked,
feature map is output of the deep model in shallow feature
layer, bilinear interpolation is applied to upsampling, and
perturbations are magnified 255 times for better visualization.
Under the premise of guaranteeing attack ability, iterative
optimization is used to calculate smaller perturbation size,
and attention mechanism is used to search more suitable
perturbation distribution.
Perturbation Distribution
The existence of adversarial examples is currently considered
to be due to local linearity of deep model, resulting the model
to be sensitive to changes in input. Firstly, one observation
in massive experiments is analyzed that gradient-based ad-
versarial perturbation is mainly concentrated near the target
object, especially the contour of the object, as shown in Fig-
ure 2. This is not difficult to understand that convolution
kernel is essentially a filter and different convolution kernels
extract different features of the same image. Shallow convo-
lution kernels extract basic texture features, and deep layers
extract abstract features. As depth of the model increases, the
receptive field of the feature layer continues to increase.
The gradient can be regarded as a quantitative assessment
of the sensitivity of input pixel to output confidence. The
background is filtered out in forward propagation due to
the lack of effective texture features. Contrarily, the target
object is retained during forward propagation due to the rich
texture features surrounding its contour, which avoid gradient
dispersion in backward propagation. That is why gradient-
based adversarial perturbations are mostly concentrated on
(a) original (b) FineFool (c) DeepFool
(d) MI-FGSM (e) BIM (f) C&W
Figure 2: The visual relationship between original clean
image and adversarial perturbations obtained by different
gradient-based attacks. And both perturbations are magnified
255 times for better visualization. Compared to other attack
methods, the perturbations obtained by FineFool is minimal,
which shows better concealment.
the target object.
To prevent the added perturbations from being filtered by
the defense method (e.g. network add-on), FineFool attempts
to focus the perturbations on classification feature distribution
with contour information. How to capture the outline features
of an object? The attention mechanism associated with the
feature map layer of neural network f is a good choice.
Spatial Attention
Attention mechanisms are mainly divided into two types: soft
attention and hard attention. Hard attention is a stochastic
process, which assigns weights based on Bernoulli distribu-
tion. In contrast, the soft attention mechanism is a parametric
weighting method that can be embedded into neural network
structure for end-to-end training, which has achieved good
performance in deep models that required global information.
Compared with the shallow features, the deep features
have a larger visual field, but spatial information of deep
feature maps is greatly lost. Therefore, the shallow feature
output of the neural network f is reconstructed to the same
dimensional space as the input via bilinear interpolation. The
different channel outputs of feature map correspond to the
filtering results of different convolution kernels. The attention
mechanism for perturbation distribution searching consist of
channel spatial attention and pixel spatial attention, where
channel spatial attention focuses on feature distribution by
weighting the different channels of feature map, and pixel
spatial attention focuses on pixel region by weighting the dif-
ferent pixels of feature map. The specific calculation process
is as follows.
Channel Spatial Attention: The channel spatial attention
weight is represented as pink rectangle in Figure 1, which is
defined as:
Wc = softmax(I
re
org ⊗ fmT ) (1)
where Ireorg ∈ R3×l is reshaped original image Iorg ∈
RH×W×3,which is shown in channel spatial attention block
of Figure 1 with khaki. And fm ∈ Rc×l denotes reshaped
reconstructed feature map, which is shown in channel spatial
attention block with green. And fmT ∈ Rl×c represents
transposed fm, l = H ×W , H and W are the height and
width of original image, c denotes the channel depth of fea-
ture map layer, ⊗ represents matrix multiplication. After
completing the matrix multiplication of Ireorg and fm
T , out-
put channel spatial attention weight Wc ∈ R3×c, which is
shown in channel spatial attention block with pink.
Pixel Spatial Attention: The pixel spatial attention weight
is represented as red rectangle in Figure 1, which is defined
as:
Wp = softmax(W
re
c  Ireorg) (2)
where W rec = Wc ⊗ fm and W rec ∈ R3×l, which repre-
sents reconstructed channel spatial attention weight with blue
in pixel spatial attention block.  means that matrix W rec
and Ireorg are multiplied by corresponding elements and then
summed by columns. And Wp ∈ R1×l is the output of pixel
spatial attention block, which is red in Figure 1.
Then the pixel attention weight Wp ∈ R1×l is reshaped
to attention map Wmap ∈ RH×W×1, which is applied to
focus the perturbations on the critical classification features
of original image. And the perturbation ρ ∈ RH×W×3 is
defined as:
ρ = Wmap  ∇xJ(Iorg, y)||∇xJ(Iorg, y)||1 (3)
where i = 1, 2, 3, which corresponds to the RGB channel of
original image. And the adversarial examples x∗ is defined
as:
x∗ = Iorg ⊕ ρ (4)
Furthermore, iterative optimization is applied to calculate
fine perturbations, and momentum-based method is used to
improve attack ability against deep model. The more details
of FineFool algorithm with momentum are presented in Al-
gorithm 1. The calculation of attention map Wmap takes
advantage of local information in feature map, which can be
combined with black-box or white-box attacks to produce
adversarial examples. And the loss function J is defined as:
J(x, y) = max(−κ, Z(x)y −max{Z(x)y′ : y
′ 6= y})
+||x− x0||22
(5)
where κ ≥ 0 is the hyper-parameter. The larger the value of
κ, the higher the reliability requirement for adversarial ex-
amples. x0 denotes original clean image, Z is the confidence
output of f , ||x − x0||22 is a regular term used to constrain
the perturbation size.
Algorithm 1: FineFool.
Input: A classifier f with loss function J ; the iteration
step length α; the number of iterations T ; the
size of perturbation ; original clean example x
and corresponding label y; and decay factor µ.
Output: Adversarial example x∗ with ||x∗ − x||∞ ≤ .
1 g0 = 0;x
∗
0 = x;
2 while i < T do
3 Input x∗i to f and obtain the gradient∇J(x∗i , y) and
feature map;
4 Obtain fmi by upsampling feature map;
5 Calculate Wc(i) based on Eq. (1);
6 Calculate Wp(i) based on Eq (2) and reshape it to
Wmap(i);
7 Update gi+1 by accumulating the velocity vector in
the gradient dirction as:
gi+1 = µ · gi + ∇Jx(x
∗
i , y)
||∇Jx(x∗i , y)||1
×Wmap(i) (6)
8 Calculate ρi = gi+1 × α;
9 Update x∗i+1 = x
∗
i + ρi;
10 if ||x∗i+1 − x||∞ >  or f(x∗i+1) 6= y then
11 break;
12 end
13 end
14 return x∗ = x∗i+1.
Experiments
Datasets: ImageNet1.
DNN models: Resnet v2, Inception-v3 (Inc-v3), and Incep-
tion Resnet v2(IncRes-v2) (Szegedy et al. 2017).
Baseline attack methods: FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
1ImageNet can be download at http://www.image-net.org/
Szegedy 2014), PGD (Madry et al. 2017), C&W (Carlini and Wag-
ner 2017), MI-FGSM (Dong et al. 2017a), DeepFool (Moosavi Dez-
fooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016). All of the above baselines are
implemented by calling foolbox2.
Defense method: Add Gaussian Blur as a filtering module
for deep model, named ‘defense 1’. Add image transform as
a filtering module (Guo et al. 2017) for deep model, named
‘defense 2’.
Platform: i7-7700K 4.20GHzx8 (CPU), TITAN Xp 12GiBx2
(GPU), 16GBx4 memory (DDR4), Ubuntu 16.04 (OS), Python
3.5, Tensorflow-gpu-1.3, Tflearn-0.3.2.
Metrics
In the experiments, mean, 0-norm, 2-norm and infinite-norm of are
applied to evaluate the size of the perturbation, which are expressed
as ρ, L0(ρ), L2(ρ) and L∞(ρ), respectively. And L0(·) distance
measurement indicates the number of pixels changed, and the L2(·)
represents the Euclidean distance between the two examples, and the
L∞(·) represents the maximum perturbations. And attack success
rate (ASR) is used to measure attack ability of adversarial examples.
White-box Attack
Table 1 gives the comparison of white-box attack results about
untargeted attack, where 5000 images are used for untargeted attack.
It is obvious that adversarial examples generated by FineFool have
stronger attack ability and smaller perturbation than the baselines.
And it can be observed that the perturbations of FineFool is the
smallest among all the attack methods under the premise of reaching
similar or higher attack effects. As the structure complexity of target
deep model increases, the perturbation shows an upward trend, and
the perturbation increment of FineFool is also the smallest.
More detailed analysis of Table 1. For untargeted attack against
Inc-v3, the ASR (99.9%) of FineFool is only a little lower than
C&W when other metrics are optimal. And untargeted attack against
IncRes-v2, the L2(ρ) = 36.9 of FineFool is only a little higher than
C&W when other metrics are optimal.
Table 1: The comparison of untargeted attack results against
different DNN models on ImageNet (white-box attack).
Target
Model Attack
Metrics
ρ L0(ρ) L2(ρ) L∞(ρ) ASR
Resnet-v2
FGSM 0.258 81.27% 81.2 13.4 59.80%
PGD 0.132 9.65% 52.2 3.5 95.40%
C&W 0.081 1.55% 48.9 2.7 97.00%
MI-FGSM 0.113 3.28% 50.2 3.2 91.20%
FineFool 0.072 1.32% 46.7 2.6 97.30%
Inc-v3
FGSM 0.139 86.33% 70.3 13.4 72.30%
PGD 0.014 3.54% 36.9 3.5 96.00%
C&W 0.013 0.62% 33.0 2.7 100.00%
MI-FGSM 0.013 1.94% 34.3 3.2 99.90%
FineFool 0.002 0.55% 32.1 2.6 99.90%
IncRes-v2
FGSM 0.145 85.21% 80.2 19.2 61.10%
PGD 0.014 3.12% 45.3 3.5 95.70%
C&W 0.013 1.09% 36.8 3.0 99.70%
MI-FGSM 0.021 2.12% 36.9 3.3 98.70%
FineFool 0.012 0.97% 36.9 2.7 99.80%
Black-box Attack
It is known that black-box attack is more difficult than white-box.
Substitute model is the most common black-box attack method.
Table 2 presents the black-box untargeted attack results on ImageNet.
2ImageNet can be download at https://foolbox.readthedocs.io/
en/latest/index.html
Compared with other adversarial attacks, all perturbation metrics of
FineFool are the best, indicating that FineFool behaves quite well
in complex datasets and target models. The models with different
structural complexity are used as substitutes for black-box attack.
It can be observed that the closer the substitute model to the target
model, the better the attack effect. And black-box attack success
rate can be improved when the substitute model is more complex
than the target model. Moreover, under the premise that perturbation
is as small as possible, the attack effect of FineFool is better than
the baselines, which demonstrates its good transfer ability.
More comprehensive description of Table 2. For untargeted attack
against black-box IncRes-v2 based on white-box Resnet-v2, the
ASR (50.90%) of FineFool is lower than ASR (51.30%) of C&W.
However, improving the ASR of FineFool to 51.30% via increasing
perturbations, the perturbation metrics of FineFool are still optimal.
Table 2: The comparison of black-box untargeted attack per-
formance based on substitute models (ImageNet, * denotes
white-box attack).
Substitute
Model Attack ρ* L0(ρ)*
ASR (black-box)
Resnet-v2 Inc-v3 IncRes-v2
Resnet-v2
FGSM 0.258 81.27% 59.8%* 35.00% 28.20%
PGD 0.132 9.65% 95.4%* 41.20% 37.80%
C&W 0.081 1.55% 97.0%* 53.20% 51.30%
MI-FGSM 0.113 3.28% 91.2%* 53.60% 48.80%
DeepFool 0.073 1.19% 95.0%* 42.50% 39.70%
FineFool 0.072 1.32% 97.3%* 54.70% 50.90%
Inc-v3
FGSM 0.139 86.33% 26.70% 72.3%* 28.20%
PGD 0.014 3.54% 38.10% 96.0%* 43.50%
C&W 0.013 0.62% 45.30% 100%* 52.10%
MI-FGSM 0.013 1.94% 39.80% 99.9%* 48.90%
DeepFool 0.012 1.28% 35.70% 98.7%* 36.90%
FineFool 0.002 0.55% 46.80% 99.9%* 53.20%
IncRes-v2
FGSM 0.145 85.21% 27.20% 32.70% 61.1%*
PGD 0.014 3.12% 45.20% 64.90% 95.7%*
C&W 0.013 1.09% 58.10% 72.10% 99.7%*
MI-FGSM 0.021 2.12% 47.10% 65.60% 98.7%*
DeepFool 0.014 12.91% 42.50% 61.10% 87.5%*
FineFool 0.012 0.97% 59.40% 75.40% 99.8%*
Confidence Analysis
Figures 3 and 5 show the visualization of perturbations and ad-
versarial images, which are obtained by different attack methods
against different deep models. It is obvious that the perturbations
of FineFool is the slightest. And Figure 4 and 6 show the logits
curves of different attacks in the iterative process corresponding to
Figures 3 and 5, respectively. The solid line with the · denotes logits
curve change corresponding to the label of adversarial example, and
the dashed line represents logits curve change corresponding to the
ground-truth label of original sample. Compared with baselines, it
can be seen that the final logits value of adversarial image obtained
by FineFool is the highest, the final logits value of original image is
the lowest, and the logits curve is linear and convergent.
Defense Methods Attack
Table 3 shows the white-box untargeted attack results of different
attack methods against Inc-v3 with different defenses on ImageNet.
The higher the ASR value, the lower the accuracy and the better
the performance of attack method. The Gaussian Blur is applied
as one of the defense methods, which’s parameter σ is 1 and the
kernel size is 3*3. Accuracy in Table 3 represents the classification
accuracy of deep model for adversarial examples generated by attack
methods. After the defense strategies are added on deep models,
the attack ability of all attack methods is greatly reduced. Gaussian
blur can effectively reduce perturbations at the expense of image
detail, which is fatal for gradient-based adversarial attacks. At the
original ρMI−FGSM ρPGD ρFineFool
AdvMI−FGSM AdvPGD AdvFineFool
Figure 3: The example of different attack methods against
Resnet-v2. And all perturbations are magnified 255 times for
better visualization.
Figure 4: The logits curve of different attack methods against
Resnet-v2 in iterations.
same time, blur results in the loss of the contour feature of the
target object, which destroys the distribution of attention map. The
reconstruction of image transform still retains the basic contour
features of the object, so FineFool still keeps stronger attack ability.
Table 3: The white-box untargeted attack results of different
attack methods against Inc-v3 with different defenses on
ImageNet.
Attack defense 1 defense 2 without defenseASR accuracy ASR accuracy ASR accuracy
MI-FGSM 54.40% 65.32% 28.97% 71.52% 99.90% 0.1%
C&W 52.30% 60.87% 32.89% 70.50% 96.00% 3.9%
FineFool 55.30% 65.34% 58.60% 50.86% 99.90% 0.1%
Conclusions
In this paper, we try to put forward a novel adversarial attack method
based on attention mechanism, FineFool, which pay more attention
to critical classification features and object contour. In the course
of adversarial attack research, an important observation has been
made by visualization that there are strong correlations between
perturbations and object contour. In order to produce more effective
adversarial examples, slighter perturbations are implemented by fo-
cusing features onto object contour. The key to FineFool is channel
spatial attention and pixel spatial attention, which focuses on chan-
nel feature distribution and pixel region distribution, respectively.
original ρMI−FGSM ρPGD ρFineFool
AdvMI−FGSM AdvPGD AdvFineFool
Figure 5: The example of different attack methods against
Inc-v3. And all perturbations are magnified 255 times for
better visualization.
Figure 6: The logits curve of different attack methods against
Inc-v3 in iterations.
Compared with the current state-of-the-art attacks, the perturbations
of FineFool can be further reduced while maintaining similar attack
success rate. From theoretical explanation and experimental analy-
sis, we can conclude that FineFool is capable of generation of high
effective adversarial examples with both better attack performance
and less perturbations. Intensive experiments on ImageNet dataset
show that the proposed method is attack effective against different
deep models with defensive network add-on, which also can be
applied to evaluate robustness of deep models and defense methods.
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